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Abstract: Per Marston (1996, p. 477), investor relations (IR) is “the link between a 
company and the financial community, providing information to help the financial 
community and the investing public to evaluate a company.” Through IR activities such 
as company presentations to and meetings with investors, firms provide information 
about their strategies, results, and prospects to their investor base. Research has identified 
that IR impacts positively a variety of dependent variables, including valuation, analyst 
coverage, and corporate reputation. However, IR has been less successful in impacting 
valuation in times when investor confidence is low. As the announcement of M&A 
activity may be associated with significant investor uncertainty in a company’s updated 
prospects for the period following the deal, I examine whether (1) the quantity of IR 
activities prior to the announcement of a deal, (2) investor rankings of company IR 
quality, or (3) the presence or absence of a conference call with investors in conjunction 
with the announcement of a deal impact (a) the cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring 
companies’ shares in the immediate period surrounding the announcement of the deal, or 
(b) the likelihood that the potential acquiring company is able to close the deal 
successfully. I find a positive relationship between a conference call after an acquisition 
announcement and the likelihood that a company would complete the deal but did not 
find a significant positive relationship between IR efforts and acquiring company stock 
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In recent decades, as companies have increased their focus on managing relationships 
with the investment community, investor relations (IR) has emerged from a side job of 
CFOs and public relations employees to a significant stand-alone function facing an 
increasing burden from growing regulatory requirements and investor demands (Laskin, 
2014). Per Marston (1996, p. 477), IR is “the link between a company and the financial 
community providing information to help the financial community and the investing 
public to evaluate a company.” Companies undertake IR activities in the hope of 
achieving a higher multiple for their stocks, lowering volatility, and growing their 
investor bases.  
IR has generally been shown to impact a variety of corporate and stock outcomes. 
Research supports that IR is positively related to share price performance (Agarwal, Liao, 
Taffler, & Nash, 2008; Jiao, 2011; Bushee & Miller, 2012). Additionally, IR can also 
lead to a lower cost of capital (Ly, 2010; Bushee & Miller, 2012; Vlittis & Charitou, 
2012), a greater level of analyst following (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Francis, Hanna, 
Philbrick, 1997; Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000; Chang, D’Anna, Watson, & Wee, 2009), 




& Lundholm, 1996). These positive outcomes are likely explained by information risk 
theory, which stipulates that liquidity and valuation multiples are positively related to the 
amount of reliable information to which investors have access (Agarwal et al., 2008; 
Agarwal, Taffler, Belloti, & Nash, 2016; Johnson, 2004). 
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, IR has also been shown to have an impact on 
corporate and stock outcomes. Bidders that use an outside IR firm are more likely to 
complete an acquisition, while targets with an outside consultant receive a significantly 
higher premium (58%) than peers (Upton, 2018). Additionally, while not a universal finding 
in all regions, research generally supports a higher abnormal return for bidders that hold a 
conference call following the announcement of an acquisition (Fraunhoffer, Kim, & 
Schiereck, 2018; Kimbrough & Louis, 2011).  
Both Fraunhoffer et al. (2018) and Kimbrough and Louis (2011) find that a bidder 
holding a conference call after the announcement of a deal is generally associated with 
positive abnormal returns surrounding the deal, but research has not yet examined whether 
pre-established IR activities before the announcement impact abnormal returns surrounding a 
deal. While existence of an external IR firm is not significantly associated with abnormal 
returns for bidders’ shares (Upton, 2018), conference calls ahead of the announcement may 
prime the pump for better returns when a bidder announces a deal. Established IR in the form 
of a “Best Investor Relations” ranking in the annual Institutional Investor (II) magazine poll 
may indicate that a company provides a higher quantity and quality of information to 
investors, which may also lead to higher levels of investor trust in the company and its 




conference calls ahead of a deal and a high ranking in the II poll may lead to improved 
returns when a company announces an acquisition.  
While Upton (2018) finds that use of an external IR firm is positively associated with the 
likelihood of a bidder completing an acquisition, that study does not review whether prior 
actions (conference calls ahead of the deal or II ranking) have a positive impact on 
completion of a deal. If preannouncement IR activities are associated with higher returns 
upon announcement of an acquisition, that market signal of a positive market return may also 
indicate a higher likelihood of completing the deal. Research has not reviewed whether 
holding a conference call following the announcement of a deal is associated with a higher 
likelihood of a bidder completing an acquisition.  
In this paper, I examine whether prior IR characteristics (frequency of IR conference calls 
in the year prior to the announcement date and a high ranking in the “Best Investor 
Relations” in the most recent annual Institutional Investor poll before announcement of the 
deal) impact the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of an 
acquisition. When I was publishing sell-side equity research analyst, I often discussed 
companies’ merger and acquisition (M&A) strategies and capabilities with management 
teams (including IR directors) prior to announcement of a deal. These discussions prior to an 
M&A announcement often informed the resulting model, price target, and opinion changes 
that followed a company’s M&A announcement. Prior IR activities may be important for 
stock and corporate outcomes in that they may lend additional credibility to an acquirer’s 
updated prospects following the M&A announcement. Prior activities may serve to provide 
some level of information about an acquirer’s M&A capabilities, including strategic 




useful to investors as they analyze an acquirer’s prospects in the wake of an acquisition 
announcement. Also given time constraints, even if an acquirer does engage in some IR 
activities (such as a conference call) following an M&A announcement, some of the 
company’s current and potential investors may be unable to participate in a conference call 
immediately following an announcement. These prior IR activities may be particularly 
important for investors given tight time constraints. In addition to reviewing the impact of IR 
activities on returns surrounding an acquisition announcement, I study whether those prior IR 
activities impact the likelihood that a bidder completes the acquisition.  
While research has begun to examine whether holding conference calls following an 
acquisition announcement impacts returns surrounding the announcement (Fraunhoffer et al, 
2018; Kimbrough & Louis, 2011), research has not yet examined whether holding a 
conference call in the near-term aftermath of an M&A announcement impacts the likelihood 
that a bidder ultimately closes the deal. Perhaps a conference call explaining the rationale of 
the acquisition that was just announced impacts investors’ attitudes toward a deal and leads 
to less proclivity for investors to try to stop the deal. As investors in both the bidder and 
target (if public) may be listening, perhaps a post-announcement conference call also causes 
target shareholders to be less likely to be against the deal. Accordingly, I examine whether 
holding a conference call following the acquisition announcement impacts the likelihood that 
a bidder completes the deal. 
This study adds to current research literature for both investor relations and M&A. To 
both streams of literature, it contributes insight into the impact of prior and concurrent 
investor relations activities on investor reaction to corporate M&A announcements. This 




shareholders may affect the likelihood that public companies are ultimately able to complete 
announced acquisitions. For IR literature, it adds to the knowledge of how IR activities or the 
investor perception of IR influence investor reactions to announcements in general. For 
M&A literature, it contributes to a better understanding of antecedents of acquiring 
companies’ share price performance and likelihood of closing an announced acquisition. 
The study also extends existing disclosure literature as investor relations is a form of 
disclosure. As public companies are required to disclose material information in their SEC 
filings, they generally announce significant M&A deals in press releases contained in SEC 
filings (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011). They often hold a conference call following the M&A 
announcement press release. The conference calls add to the information environment 
surrounding the deals by providing additional details and forward-looking statements that 
were not contained in the corresponding press releases. While Regulation FD prohibits 
companies from disclosing previously undisclosed material nonpublic information in these 
investor calls, these calls may also add to investor understanding of the business environment 
and rationale for an M&A deal. 
Research on the relationship between concurrent investor relations activities and stock 
returns for bidders upon the announcement of M&A deals is mixed. This study appears to be 
the first to examine whether prior established IR activities (transcripts in the year before the 
announcement) or investor perceived IR quality (Institutional Investor IR ranking) are 
associated with abnormal returns for bidders’ shares surrounding acquisition announcements. 
Additionally, as prior studies have found inconsistent results on the relationship between 
holding an IR conference call following an acquisition announcement and share price 




This research also has broad practical implications as companies are required to provide 
information to their investor bases. Companies hope that their IR activities lead to favorable 
corporate and stock outcomes, including share price performance and corporate objectives. 
As M&A activities may represent critical events for companies, IR may be more important in 
this context than in a general business context. Shareholder resistance and poor share 
performance following an acquisition announcement may represent a particularly 
unfavorable outcome that management teams are eager to avoid. As such, a better 
understanding of the role of IR in M&A is useful in organizing efforts to communicate about 









According to Laskin (2014), IR is a relatively new discipline, dating generally back to 
the time frame following World War II. In the 1950s and 1960s, IR was characterized by 
public relations specialists who focused on investors; but by the 1970s, professional 
investors tended to bypass these public relations specialists by going directly to CFOs 
(Laskin, 2014). The IR function matured in the 1980s as IR departments were in place in 
16% of Fortune 500 companies in 1984 and 56% as of the end of 1994 as shareholder 
resolutions that were unfavorable to management caused companies to establish such 
departments (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999). However, despite increased attention to the 
activities of IR personnel that arose from the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, IR is 
only now starting to become a focus for public relations research (Chandler, 2014). 
There are two rival academic views of the potential for the IR function to affect 
corporate valuation in general. Under efficient markets theory, IR is not be expected to 
affect stock prices as the function merely repackages information that investors already 
possess (Merton, 1987; Peasnell, Talib, & Young, 2011). Despite the predictions of 
efficient markets theory, most recent research (Agarwal et al, 2008; Bushee & Miller, 




drive higher corporate valuation because better communication allows investors to model and 
value companies more accurately and leads to an enhanced corporate reputation. Conducting 
IR activities is a costly process. Companies incur substantial expenses, including 
employment of IR personnel, hosting investors at conferences and site visits, traveling to 
meet investors, and production of IR materials. As rational entities, they only incur these 
expenses if they expect to realize benefits from them. Empirical evidence indicates that 
effective IR leads to better outcomes, including more analysts following the stock (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996; Francis et al., 1997; Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000; Chang et al. 2009), 
lower disparity of analyst forecasts (Farragher et al., 1994; Lang & Lundholm, 1996), an 
improved overall corporate reputation (de Jong et al., 2007), and a lower cost of capital (Ly, 
2010; Bushee & Miller, 2012; Vlittis & Charitou, 2012).  
Support for the relationships between IR and positive corporate and stock outcomes can 
be found in the information assimilation literature. As the vast amount of information 
available to investors may be more than they can absorb quickly, companies’ IR may help 
investors to process available information most efficiently. Chapman, Miller, and White 
(2019) describe assimilation as “synthesizing information (e.g., relating firm press releases 
back to firm strategy and/or industry conditions), summarizing information, correcting 
misinformation, and clarifying details” (Chapman et al., 2019, p. 106). Chapman et al. (2019) 
find that IR efforts to help investors obtain and understand company-related information are 
successful. Companies that employ IR officers have lower stock volatility, narrower analyst 
forecast ranges, more accurate analyst forecasts, and faster price discovery than their peers 
that did not employ IR officers. Additionally, these relationships are stronger for companies 




(2019) find that when the IR officer changes, the effects reverse themselves as forecasts 
widen and became less accurate and stock volatility increases. They attribute the 
relationships between IR and the various outcomes to the role that investor relations plays in 
helping market participants in assimilating information. Similarly, Reyes (2018) also 
attributes the positive relationship between news coverage and stock price reaction to M&A 
announcements to faster assimilation of M&A information by professional investors, who 
may represent a higher percentage of investors aware of a low news-coverage deal (and may 
be more likely to view the deal negatively). 
Supporting the view that IR can impact valuation and other corporate objectives, Bushee, 
Gerakos, and Lee (2018) use a corporate jet data set to find that companies who fly to meet 
investors on private roadshows have more analyst forecast changes, larger abnormal stock 
price movements, and shareholder ownership changes in the region of the roadshow than 
other types of flights. Similarly, Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang (2016) find that analyst visits 
to corporate sites of Chinese listed firms lead to more accurate forecasts while Brockman, 
Subasi, and Uzmanoglu (2017) find that companies who participate in investor conferences 
are rewarded with greater liquidity for their shares than for their peers who do not participate. 
Agarwal et al. (2016) find that both large and small companies with higher IR quality (as 
measured by IR Magazine “Best Overall IR” award nominations) receive higher stock 
multiples than their peers that did not receive nominations. Similarly, they find that increases 
in IR quality lead to more analyst coverage and more liquidity for shares. A one place 
increase in IR Magazine “Best Overall IR” award nominations equates to a 6.7% and 15.8% 
improvement in the market capitalization of large and small companies, respectively. 




have higher Tobin’s Q ratios. Ly (2010) discovers that shares of Japanese companies that 
were members of the Japanese Investor Relations Association (a proxy for IR activity) have a 
lower bid-ask spread than non-member peers.  
The potential value of an effective IR function is further demonstrated in Bushee and 
Miller (2012), who study small- and mid-cap companies that engage outside IR firms to 
create a new IR strategy. Compared with a control set of companies matched to the IR hiring 
companies, the companies that hired IR firms receive more media coverage, analyst 
coverage, and professional institutions owning their shares. They also find that companies 
that initiate a new IR strategy also receive a higher stock multiple as measured by the book-
to-price ratio.  
There are several links between IR and stock outcomes. Improved disclosure could be a 
link as Cheynel (2013) finds that companies that make voluntary disclosures have a lower 
cost of capital than peers that do not disclose. Similarly, increased analyst coverage could 
also be a link as Bassen et al. (2010) support analyst coverage as a link between investor 
relations and stock outcomes. Research supports the notion that stocks of companies that 
present at investor conferences (another form of IR activity) are rewarded with positive 
abnormal returns (Karolyi & Liao, 2017). 
Research in 1996 by Lang and Lundholm shows that IR is a consistent factor impacting 
security analyst actions as analysts use their direct company interactions as first-hand 
information. Companies that are more forthcoming in disclosures tend to have more 
securities analysts covering their stocks. Additionally, they find that more disclosure leads to 
a wider set of potential investors, a lower cost of capital, more accurate and less volatile 




consistency in analyst earnings per share forecasts for companies with high IR quality ratings 
(as determined by Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee ratings) 
than for low IR quality companies (Farragher et al., 1994). 
Francis et al. (1997) find that companies that make presentations to securities analysts 
tend to benefit from more analyst coverage relative to before making the presentation, as well 
as relative to peer companies. This study finds similar increases in analyst coverage for both 
small- and large-cap companies, but unlike Lang and Lundholm (1996) they did not find that 
the presentations led to less dispersion or more accuracy in analyst forecasts. Accordingly, 
the investor presentations may provide only a limited benefit to security analysts (Francis et 
al., 1997).  
The finding that an effective IR function impacts equity valuation positively is not 
universal. One of the first studies of IR effectiveness, Dennis (1973), reviews whether a 
company’s employment of an outside IR firm has an impact on its common stock. The study 
finds no evidence that employment of independent IR firms has any effect on the client 
company’s share price.  
Additionally, the potential for an effective IR function to have a positive impact on 
corporate valuation may not hold true for all time frames. For the period following the Enron 
scandal, Peasnell et al. (2011) did not find that companies with strong IR reputations were 
able to avoid a general market decline in management and financial reporting credibility. 
Thus, a strong IR function may not provide a safeguard to companies during periods 




IR in an M&A Context 
As the announcement of an acquisition is associated with significant investor uncertainty, 
acquisition announcements may be a high leverage time frame for IR. Research has begun to 
examine the relationship between IR and M&A outcomes. Supporting the value of IR to 
M&A, Bushee and Miller (2012) find that companies that make a significant M&A deal are 
more likely to begin an IR program. Similarly, interviews of corporate managers indicate that 
they seek investor support for acquisitions (Hendry, Sanderson, Barker, & Roberts, 2006), 
while surveys of IR officers indicate that they are likely to reach out to sell-side and buy-side 
analysts after significant M&A deals (Brown, Call, Clement, & Sharp, 2019). Finally, Green, 
Jame, Markov, and Subasi (2014) find that companies that finance acquisitions with equity 
attend more investor conferences than peer companies. 
Upton (2018) studies the relationship between use of IR specialists and cumulative 
abnormal returns of stocks on deal announcements. She examines whether employment of an 
external IR firm affects a series of deal outcomes, including cumulative abnormal returns for 
IR employing bidders’ shares surrounding the deal announcement, higher premiums for IR 
employing target firm, higher likelihood of deal completion for IR employing bidders, lower 
likelihood of deal completion for IR employing targets that do not want to be acquired, and 
increased ability to impact timing of deal completion for IR employing bidders and targets.  
Upton (2018) uses datasets including IR firms’ client lists and Thomson Financial’s 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database of successful/unsuccessful acquisitions announced 
by public bidders between 2007 and 2011. In order to be included in the study, the deal had 
to be worth more than $1 million, the bidder could not own more than 10% of the target 




transaction, and the deal had to be worth more than 1% of the bidder’s market cap. Roughly 
23% of bidders in the study used an IR firm, compared with 9% of targets. The average deal 
size was $433 million, and bidders ultimately completed 89% of announced deals in the 
sample. Upton matched IR and non-IR bidders based on a propensity score matching method.  
Upton (2018) obtains mixed results. The hypothesis that shares of bidders that employed 
an external IR firm would enjoy higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the 
deal is not supported. While the study does not support that bidder shares would benefit from 
IR, the matched sample supports the hypothesis that bidders that had an outside IR firm are 
more likely to complete the acquisition. Ninety-two percent of bidders employing IR firms 
complete deals, above the 88% for bidders that did not employ an IR firm. For targets, Upton 
finds that targets that have an outside IR consultant receive a 55.8% higher premium than 
peers that do not have an outside consultant (Upton, 2018).  
Kimbrough and Louis (2011) and Fraunhoffer et al. (2018) review the effect of IR 
conference calls on the day of or day after an announcement of M&A deals on stock price 
reaction. Kimbrough and Louis (2011) review U.S.-based M&A deals from 2002 to 2006. To 
include the deal in the study, Kimbrough and Louis (2011) require the deal to be worth at 
least 10% of the bidder’s market cap; a press release announcing the deal; and no missing 
data on the payment type (stock/cash), transaction value, and date of announcement in 
Compustat. Additionally, announcements about deals that had already been completed are 
excluded from the study. The final sample includes 1,228 deals.  
Kimbrough and Louis (2011) find that conference calls are more often held for larger 
transactions and stock financed transactions. After controlling for the likelihood of a 




three days commencing with the announcement date for stocks of bidders that hold 
conference calls are significantly higher than for bidders that do not hold calls. As 
subsequent share price performance for conference call holding bidders is not worse than that 
of bidders that do not hold calls, it appears that these gains are not temporary in nature. 
Kimbrough and Louis (2011) also estimate the abnormal accruals for bidders as of the 
quarter before announcing the acquisition. Based on this analysis, bidders that hold 
conference calls for acquisitions to be funded with stock have lower abnormal accruals prior 
to the acquisition than peers that do not hold calls. As companies that manage earnings prior 
to deals are not more likely to hold calls, the authors argue that conference calls are held to 
provide information to investors, rather than just to build up the stock. Finally, Kimbrough 
and Louis (2011) also perform a small sample content analysis of conference calls. The 
analysis supports the notion that conference calls disclose more information and are more 
forward looking than press releases. 
The finding that conference calls lead to higher cumulative abnormal returns following an 
M&A announcement is not universal. Fraunhoffer et al. (2018) review transactions from 
France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K. from 2008 to 2012. Duplicate 
transactions and transactions with missing returns and accounting data are excluded from the 
analysis. The transactions for which nondiscrete variables are at the top 1% and bottom 1% 
of values are winsorized and excluded from the analysis. The final dataset is comprised of 
2,518 transactions, of which 216 are associated with a conference call on the announcement 
date or the following day.  
Similar to Kimbrough and Louis (2011), Fraunhoffer et al. (2018) review the factors that 




the likelihood of a call include transaction value, the ratio of the total transaction value to the 
bidder’s market cap, whether the target is public, whether the consideration is all cash, 
whether the target is headquartered in a different country from the acquirer, whether the 
bidder and target are in the same industry, the bidder’s market cap, the bidder’s leverage, the 
bidder’s industry, and whether the economy is in a crisis year (2008-2010). Transaction value 
(+), whether the target is public (+), whether the target is in the same industry as the bidder 
(+), bidder’s market cap (+), and crisis year (-) are significantly related to the likelihood of a 
call. As in the Kimbrough and Louis (2011) study, larger deals are more likely to be 
accompanied by a conference call (Fraunhoffer et al., 2018).  
Fraunhoffer et al. (2018) use the conference call date as day 0 and review the CARs for 
two time frames: (1) 230 days before the call to 31 days before the call, and (2) 10 days 
before the call to 10 days after the call. The study controls for self-selection bias. While the 
CAR for stocks of bidders that held a conference call is 1.7% higher than nonconference call 
bidders from day 0 to day 2 in this study, that result is somewhat weaker than the 6.5% found 
in the three-day period around the deal in the Kimbrough and Louis (2011) study, it is 
nonetheless positive overall. The study only finds favorable share price reaction to 
conference calls in the U.K. and France. Additionally, the abnormal returns are only 
observed for bidders in certain industries (technology, industrials, and materials), while 
energy, finance, and healthcare bidders are not rewarded for holding a call (Fraunhoffer et 
al., 2018). 
Mama and Bassen (2017) review European data to determine whether IR quality is 
related to the ways that companies use their cash. The study finds that in general, higher 




use cash on capital expenditures that detract from shareholder value. The study does not find 
a significant relationship between IR quality and level of M&A activity. IR can also impact 
target outcomes in an M&A context. Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2012) find that target 
firms that release quarterly guidance receive higher acquisition premiums, but only if the 
bidder does not provide guidance. 
My study appears to be the first to review the relationship between key IR activities 
(conference calls) prior to announcements and returns for bidders’ shares surrounding 
acquisition announcements. It also appears to be the first study to examine whether a high 
degree of investor perceived IR quality (Institutional Investor IR ranking) results in abnormal 
returns for bidders’ shares surrounding acquisition announcements. Additionally, as prior 
studies find inconsistent results on the relationship between holding an IR conference call 
following an acquisition announcement and share price reaction, the proposed study is a 
more recent examination of this relationship. To my knowledge, it is also the first study to 
review whether IR activity and IR quality lead to a higher likelihood of bidders successfully 
closing announced acquisitions. 
Hypothesis Development 
The announcement of an M&A deal may be a particularly important time for IR. Deals 
come with significant amounts of investment information that investors seek to understand in 
order to value stocks. Additionally, the time frame surrounding announcements may be 
characterized by significant uncertainty concerning the rationale for deals. By helping 
investors to understand the rationale for potential deals before announcements, IR may 
expedite the information assimilation process. Armed with better insight into a more 




investors should be able to identify stock buying opportunities more quickly than if they 
needed to do this investigation following acquisition announcements. 
Another reason that stocks of more active IR companies should outperform peers in an 
M&A context is that assessing the potential effects of a proposed acquisition on an acquiring 
firm’s stock price is a costly process. Analyst time is limited, and using that time to evaluate 
one stock may come at an opportunity cost of analyzing other stocks for the portfolio. By 
providing IR activities more frequently or more effectively, firms create a more robust 
information environment (Wang, Lin, & Yen 2016). In so doing, firms may help to lessen the 
time that analysts have to spend on their stock, thus reducing the effective overall cost of 
owning or purchasing the stock. In an M&A context, by reducing the investor cost of 
analyzing the potential valuation of an announced acquisition, more effective IR acquirers 
may be less expensive to own than less-effective acquirers. Thus, stocks of more active IR 
companies should outperform the stocks of peers following an acquisition announcement.  
IR activities prior to a deal announcement may also “prime the pump” for investor 
appetite for an M&A deal. As a sell-side equity research analyst, I often discussed company 
M&A strategies and capabilities with management teams (including IR directors) and used 
these insights in evaluating a company’s updated prospects following an acquisition 
announcement. To the extent that investors understand ahead of time the rationale and 
potential strategic and earnings contribution of an acquisition, they may be less likely to 
object to an acquisition and more likely to favor it. IR should be able to assist investors in 
understanding a company’s ability to finance an acquisition, integrate an acquired entity, and 




more favorable investor sentiment concerning a company’s potential acquisition and thus 
improved returns upon a deal announcement.  
In addition to the rationale for a deal, key uncertainties in an acquiring company’s stock 
may also include the likelihood and time frame for closing the acquisition and potential 
synergies and earnings contributions from the acquired entity. While IR activities prior to the 
deal announcement would be unlikely to include information concerning deal time lines, 
synergies, and ultimate earnings accretion, following an announcement, company 
management would likely have a much clearer view on these crucial elements than outside 
investors would be able to glean from their research. Thus, IR activities in the aftermath of 
the deal announcement may assist investors in understanding key elements that will affect 
their revised estimation of the stock’s fair value following the deal announcement.  
Another possible benefit from IR activities prior to the announcement of a deal is that IR 
may be considered a two-way communication process (Chapman et al., 2019). When 
investors discuss potential M&A opportunities with a company, they can communicate to the 
company characteristics of an M&A deal that they would favor and those that that they 
would not. By understanding deal characteristics to which investors would likely object, 
management can avoid deals that would be harshly received by the investment community. 
Additionally, companies with increased IR activities in the period before deal announcement 
may be armed with a better understanding of likely objections and thus able to more 
precisely anticipate and respond to these objections in the post M&A announcement time 
frame.  
In summary, IR leads to better information, which lowers the informational uncertainty to 




in an M&A context as well. Based on information risk theory, which stipulates that liquidity 
and valuation multiples are positively related to the amount of reliable information to which 
investors have access, stocks of acquirers to which investors have better information should 
outperform lower information peers (Agarwal et al., 2008; Agarwal et al., 2016; Johnson, 
2004). Thus, I propose the following. 
H1: Cumulative abnormal returns in the five days surrounding an acquisition 
announcement should be higher/less bad for acquirers with higher scores in 
Institutional Investor IR poll. 
H2: Cumulative abnormal returns in the five days surrounding an acquisition 
announcement should be higher/less bad for acquirers that conduct more investor 
conference calls in the year before the announcement of a deal. 
H3: Cumulative abnormal returns in the five days surrounding an acquisition 
announcement should be higher/less bad for acquirers that conduct one or more 
investor conference calls in the period from the day of the announcement to two 
days following the announcement. 
 
In addition to leading to more favorable stock price outcomes, IR should also have 
positive implications to the likelihood that a firm successfully closes an announced 
acquisition. There are several reasons that IR activities should be positively associated with 
increased likelihood of acquisition close. 
First, if proposed Hypotheses 1 through 3 are supported, then IR activities lead to 
stronger abnormal stock price returns around the time of the announcement of an acquisition. 
These returns might provide a market-based signal that the proposed acquisition is a positive 
event for the acquiring company. One reason an acquisition might be terminated is that 
investors communicate objections to the acquisition to the acquirer’s management team. The 
aforementioned market-based signal of stock return outperformance might cause investors to 
be less likely to object to announced acquisitions for acquirers that are better at IR or do 




In addition to not receiving investor pressure to terminate an announced acquisition, 
management teams of firms whose stocks have outperformed following an acquisition 
announcement might be more committed to completing that announced acquisition 
successfully. If a management team believes that the outperformance in its stock is at least 
partially due to the acquisition announcement, then it might see terminating the acquisition as 
a potential catalyst for the stock outperformance to reverse. Such a management team might 
be more likely to respond with a higher offer if another company made a higher bid for the 
proposed target instead of terminating the proposed acquisition. Thus, if IR activities 
influence cumulative abnormal stock returns surrounding an acquisition, they might also 
influence the likelihood that an acquirer ultimately completes the acquisition successfully.  
As outlined before, IR may provide firms insights on potential acquisition targets or deal 
characteristics to which investors object. Firms with more IR activities may have better 
insights on those acquisitions that would carry a likely negative response. As a result, firms 
with more IR activities may be better able to avoid those acquisitions that might cause their 
stock to underperform. In this way, IR activities prior to an M&A announcement might lead 
to a higher percentage of good deals (accompanied by stock outperformance) and a lower 
percentage of bad deals (accompanied by stock underperformance). Assuming that 
companies are more likely to work to complete deals that investors favor, IR activities might 
positively influence the likelihood that a company successfully completes an announced 
acquisition. 
Additionally, informational asymmetry might provide a challenge to investors trying to 
value the stock following an acquisition announcement. Given the cost (including time and 




an acquisition if they do not expect the resulting potential stock benefit to outweigh the cost 
of evaluating it. IR activities prior to and immediately following an M&A announcement 
may eliminate some of the informational asymmetry surrounding the deal. The resulting 
lessened informational asymmetry might be a way that IR lowers the acquiring company’s 
stock ownership costs to investors, who are no longer required to do as much work to 
evaluate a potential acquisition. Since the costs of evaluating a deal are lessened, investors 
may be less likely to try to force the acquiring company’s management to terminate an 
acquisition. 
An acquiring company’s IR efforts may also influence the likelihood of successful 
completion of an acquisition by influencing target shareholders. If target shareholders are 
influenced by the acquirer’s IR efforts, they may be more likely to advocate for the company 
to complete the sale. There are several reasons to expect that an acquirer’s IR efforts could 
influence target shareholders. In the case of stock deals, target shareholders receive stock as a 
form of compensation. IR may influence these shareholders to recommend the target’s 
management and board of directors to approve the sale to the acquirer if the target 
shareholders believe that the expected future value of the acquirer’s shares plus other 
considerations related to the deal are above the future value of the target's shares without this 
sale. Even if the form of consideration is not stock based, the acquirer may have shareholders 
in common with a public target. Information provided by the acquirer’s IR efforts may 
influence these shareholders to expect the combined return to their portfolio from a 
successfully completed transaction to be above the return from the two companies separately. 
In that case, the shareholders in common to the two companies might advocate that the target 




likelihood that it successfully completes the acquisition by influencing the target 
shareholders. Thus, I propose the following. 
H4: The likelihood of successfully closing an acquisition is higher for acquirers with 
higher scores in Institutional Investor IR poll. 
H5: The likelihood of successfully closing an acquisition is higher for acquirers that 
conduct more investor conference calls in the year before the announcement of a 
deal. 
H6: The likelihood of successfully closing an acquisition is higher for acquirers that 
conduct one or more investor conference calls in the period from the day of the 








RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES 
 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The study investigates the relationships between IR and corporate and stock outcomes 
in an acquisition context. To examine these relationships, I use a sample of acquisitions 
made by U.S. domiciled, publicly traded firms between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2018. 
The sample acquisitions were obtained from the SDC U.S. Mergers & Acquisitions 
database. The study time frame begins in July 2012 — 2011 is the first year for which I 
have access to a complete list of investor call transcripts on CapitalIQ — and ended in 
June 2018 to allow ample time for acquirers to have completed or cancelled the 
acquisition by the time the study is conducted (early 2020). Several requirements are 
necessary for an acquisition to be considered in the sample. First, the acquirer must be 
included in the S&P 500 as of the most recent July 1, domiciled in the U.S., and traded on 
a U.S. exchange for at least one calendar year prior to the acquisition announcement. I 
view the S&P 500 as appropriate as it represents roughly 80% of the market 
capitalization of U.S. stocks (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2020). Second, the transaction size 
must be at least $10 million and represent at least 10% of the acquiring firm’s market 




50%), but not already over 10% of the target prior to the announcement. Fourth, as in Upton 
(2018), the proposed transaction must not be a bankruptcy acquisition, reverse takeover, 
liquidation, or restructuring. As in Kimbrough and Louis (2011), the transaction must not be 
completed as of the announcement date. Finally, the data to calculate the control variables 
and the CAR must be available. The above steps are outlined in Table 1, yielding a final 
sample size of 227 acquisition announcements. 
Table 1. Details of Sample Selection Procedures 
Sample Details Number of Transactions 
Acquisitions listed in SDC U.S. Mergers & Acquisitions database 9,323 
Removed: Not in S&P 500 (5,951) 
Removed: Transaction value (1,650) 
Removed: Percentage of market cap sought (1,356) 
Removed: Percentage of target stock already owned (105) 
Removed: Restructuring transaction (18) 
Removed: Acquisition of assets as part of a bankruptcy (4) 
Removed: Duplicate transaction in database (1) 
Removed: Negative equity book value/controls at extreme levels (10) 
Observations included in the final sample 227 
 
Dependent Variables 
The two dependent variables used in this study are cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding the acquisition announcement date and whether the acquirer completed the 
announced acquisition. The first dependent variable is the CAR surrounding the 
announcement date. I expect companies that conduct more IR conference calls in the year 
prior to the deal, conduct more conference calls immediately following the deal 
announcement, and rank in the top three companies in the Institutional Investor “Best IR” 
buy-side poll for their sector to enjoy better CARs than their less active or less successful 
counterparts. Like Upton (2018), CAR is measured for the five-day period starting with two 
trading days prior to the acquisition announcement date and concluding with the second 




(1985), abnormal returns for each day during the five-day period surrounding the acquisition 
announcement is calculated as follows.  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  
where for each stock i, ARit is the abnormal return of stock ί on day t, Rit is the return of stock 
ί on day t, and Rmt is the return of the CRSP value weighted index on day t. The return for the 
stock is calculated based on the stock price at the end of the day, plus per share dividends 
paid on the day, divided by the closing stock price from three days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. After the abnormal return for each day during the five-day period is 
calculated, the CAR for each stock i, CARί,k,l is calculated as the summed abnormal returns 
over the event time as follows.  




where for each stock i, CARi [-2, +2] is the summed daily abnormal returns from day minus 
two (k = 1) to day plus two (l = 5), with day zero as the date of acquisition announcement. I 
obtained cumulative abnormal return data from Eventus. 
To evaluate the first three hypotheses, I use the following regression equation. 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖[−2, +2] = β0  +  β1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  +  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 +  ε𝑖𝑖  
where for each stock i, CARi [-2, +2] is the return over day minus two to day plus two, with 
day zero as the date of acquisition announcement; β1 Investor Relationsi indicates one of the 
three investor relations related independent variables (pre-announcement investor relations 
conference calls for the 365 days prior to the announcement, post-announcement investor 
relations conference calls for the announcement date and the two subsequent business days, 




sector in the most recent poll conducted by Institutional Investor prior to the announcement). 
The Controlsi variable in the equation represents the various controls as described in the 
control variables discussion later in this section. 
The second dependent variable is the likelihood of the acquirer ultimately completing the 
announced acquisition, available from the SDC database. The underlying variable is binary in 
nature: 0 if the acquirer ultimately completes the announced acquisition, 1 if not. As noted 
previously, if the acquirer has already completed the acquisition when the announcement is 
made, the transaction is excluded from the sample. 
To test the second set of hypotheses, in which likelihood of completing the deal is the 
dependent variable, I use the following regression equation. 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  = β0  +  β1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  +  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 +  ε𝑖𝑖 
where for each stock i, Completioni represents the expected percentage likelihood of 
completing the deal; β1 Investor Relationsi indicates one of the three investor relations related 
independent variables (pre-announcement investor relations conference calls for the 365 days 
prior to the announcement, post-announcement investor relations conference calls for the 
announcement date and the two subsequent business days, and whether the company was 
ranked by buy-side investors as in the top three IR teams in its sector in the most recent poll 
conducted by Institutional Investor prior to the announcement). The Controlsi variable in the 
equation represents the various controls as described in the control variables discussion later 
in this section. 
Independent Variables 
To measure the quantity of IR activity for companies with acquisitions that meet the 




the conference call transcript database in CapitalIQ. I count the number of investor 
conference call transcripts in CapitalIQ for the 365 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement (Callsbefore) and the announcement date through two trading days following 
the announcement (Callafter). Using the count of the transcripts in the 365 days prior to the 
announcement, I proxy for the activity levels in advance of the deal that could lead to 
favorable reactions to an acquisition announcement. Using the count of transcripts for the 
announcement date and the two trading days following, I proxy for the activities that explain 
the specific rationale and expected outcomes from the acquisition immediately in the wake of 
the announcement.  
The most recent “Best Investor Relations” results conducted by Institutional Investor 
magazine is used as a proxy for investor perceived quality of a company’s IR prior to the 
acquisition announcement (Top3II). This annual poll of buy-side investors is conducted from 
May to June. For deals announced between January and June, I use the poll conducted in the 
prior calendar year. For deals announced between July and December, I use the poll 
conducted in that calendar year. The annual Institutional Investor magazine survey is a 
binary category. A company is considered to have a high degree of IR perceived quality if it 
is ranked in the top three positions in its sector in the most recent poll conducted before the 
acquisition announcement. Alternatively, the company is not considered to have a high 
degree of IR perceived quality prior to the acquisition announcement.  
Control Variables 
Several deal-related control variables are included in the regression model used in the 
study. The first deal-related control variable (Public) is whether the target is public or 




as prior literature indicates that public targets have historically been associated with a lower 
stock return for the bidder. Public company shares have more liquidity than private 
companies. Bidders pay higher premiums for public companies as a result (Fraunhoffer et al., 
2018; Conn, Cosh, Guest, & Hughes, 2005; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). 
As in prior studies on M&A, the model also controls for the form of consideration offered 
by the acquirer to the target. Prior research supports that cash acquisitions generally lead to 
positive stock returns for acquirers, while stock acquisitions lead to negative stock returns 
(Kimbrough & Louis, 2011). Accordingly, the model used in this study includes the 
following indicator variables (Form of consideration: Stock or Cash).  
Similar to Kimbrough and Louis (2011), the model also includes a variable (Foreign) to 
represent whether the target is domestic or foreign. As foreign targets may be less familiar to 
domestic investors, acquisitions of foreign targets are likely to be accompanied by higher 
investor informational needs and lower investor uncertainty. Accordingly, all else equal, 
acquirer stock returns on acquisitions of foreign targets are expected to be lower than for 
domestic targets. 
The model also includes a variable to indicate whether the announced acquisition is a 
diversifying deal (Diversify). As defined in Upton (2018), a diversifying deal is defined as 
one in which the target does not share the same two-digit SIC code as the acquirer. 
Diversifying deals may be associated with more uncertainty than acquisitions in the same 
industry for two reasons. First, they are less likely to be as well understood by the acquirer’s 
investor base, which logically already has some knowledge of the acquirer’s industry. 




for investors to estimate, as compared with synergies between companies in the same 
industry. 
In addition to the aforementioned control variables related to M&A, the regression model 
includes several general control variables based on prior literature (Agarwal et al., 2016; 
Bushee & Miller, 2012; Chapman et al., 2019; Koch et al., 2012). These control variables 
include the acquirer’s industry, log of firm market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, 








RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, I present my study’s sample descriptive statistics and the results of each 
of the hypothesis tests. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
As described in the sample selection section, my sample consisted of 227 acquisition 
announcements that met the study’s criteria. Table 2 depicts the distribution of 
announcements by year in the sample. Table 3 shows the means, medians, standard 
deviations, the minimum and maximum values for the continuous numeric variables, and 
the distributions of the discrete variables in the sample. Table 4 contains the correlation 
coefficients for the variables in the study. Variable definitions are shown in Appendix.  
Table 2. M&A Announcements Included in the Sample by Year 
Years Transactions Percent of Sample 
FY Ended June 30, 2013 37 16.3 
FY Ended June 30, 2014 27 11.9 
FY Ended June 30, 2015 42 18.5 
FY Ended June 30, 2016 42 18.5 
FY Ended June 30, 2017 37 16.3 
FY Ended June 30, 2018 42 18.5 
Total 227 100.0 
 
Reviewing the distribution of the dependent variables as shown in Table 3, the 




beginning two days prior to the acquisition announcement and concluding two days 
following the announcement (dependent variable for Hypotheses 1-3). The highest 
cumulative abnormal return observed in the sample was a 37.65% abnormal return over the 
five-day period and the lowest was a -19.15% abnormal return. For the set of hypotheses 
concerning completion of the deal (Hypotheses 4-6), 197 of the 227 announced acquisitions 
in the study (86.8% of observations) were completed.  
Reviewing the descriptive statistics for the independent variables of interest in the study, 
44 of the acquirers (19.4% of the sample) had a top three position in the most recent annual 
“Best IR” poll conducted by Institutional Investor magazine prior to the announcement date 
(independent variable for Hypotheses 1 and 4). The remaining 183 acquirers in the sample 
(80.6%) were not ranked in the top three companies in the most recent “Best IR” poll. 
Additionally, each of the acquirers in the sample conducted at least four investor conference 
calls in the 365 days prior to the announcement. The mean number of investor conference 
calls conducted by an acquirer was 8.34, and the most calls any acquirer in the sample 
conducted was 21 (independent variable for Hypotheses 2 and 5). Finally, 193 of the 
acquirers (85%) held at least one investor conference call between the announcement date 
and two trading days following the announcement date, while 15% of acquirers in the sample 
did not hold a call (independent variable for Hypotheses 3 and 6).  
Reviewing the control variables, the mean natural log of acquirer market capitalization 
was 9.8306, equating to mean acquirer market capitalization of $32,017 million. The 
minimum and maximum natural logs of acquirer market capitalization were 7.6413 and 





The mean acquirer market-to-book ratio (as calculated by the market capitalization four 
weeks prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the most recent equity book value 
for the most recent fiscal year concluded prior to the acquisition announcement) was 3.70x, 
ranging from a low of 0.40x to a high of 12.70x. The mean acquirer leverage ratio (as 
calculated by total liabilities divided by total assets for the most recent fiscal year concluded 
prior to the acquisition announcement) was 0.62, ranging from a low of 0.00 to a high of 
0.97. Mean acquirer return on equity was 0.16, ranging from a low of -0.26 to a high of 0.80. 
Reviewing the sample transactions, cash was the most common form of consideration 
observed in the sample (128 or 56.4% of observations), followed by mixed consideration (83 
or 36.6% of observations). The remaining 16 observations (7% of the sample) consisted of 
stock consideration only. Roughly three quarters of the acquisitions involved a public target 
(175 or 77.1% of observations), while the remaining 52 targets in the sample (22.9%) were 
private. Roughly one quarter of the observations (62 or 27.3% of observations) were 
diversifying deals (target’s two-digit SIC code was different from the acquirer’s). Finally, 45 
of the acquisitions in the sample (19.8% of observations) involved a target not domiciled in 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Continuous Variables 
Variable Name N Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
CAR 227 0.0089 0.0046 0.0750 -0.1915 0.3765 
Independent Variable 
Callsbefore 227 8.3392 8.0000 3.0778 4.0000 21.0000 
Control Variables 
LogMV 227 9.8306 9.6753 0.9728 7.6413 12.4898 
AcqMtB 227 3.7035 3.0883 2.4206 0.3951 12.6957 
Lev 227 0.6214 0.6327 0.1595 0.0000 0.9693 
ROE 227 0.1569 0.1451 0.1412 -0.2586 0.8030 
Panel B. Discrete Variables 
Variable Name N Number Percent 
Dependent Variable    
Complete 227 197 86.8 
Independent Variables    
Top3II 227 44 19.4 
Callafter 227 193 85.0 
Control Variables    
Formofconsideration 227   
Cash  128 56.4 
Stock  16 7.0 
Mixed  83 36.6 
Public 227 175 77.1 
Diversify 227 62 27.3 
Foreign 227 45 19.8 
See Appendix for the variable definitions. 
 
To review the effect of industry as a control variable, I grouped acquirers by their major 
SIC divisions. Acquirers in the sample represented eight of the 10 major SIC industry 
divisions. Manufacturing (109 observations or 48% of the sample) was the most represented 
classification, followed by Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate (31 observations or 13.7% of 
the sample), Transportation & Public Utilities (30 observations or 13.2% of the sample), and 




Table 4. Industry Information 
Industrya Count Percentage of Total 
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 3 1.3 
Construction 1 0.4 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 31 13.7 
Manufacturing 109 48.0 
Mining 14 6.2 
Services 22 9.7 
Transportation & Public Utilities 30 13.2 
Wholesale Trade 17 7.5 
Total 227 100.0 
a Companies were assigned to industries as follows: Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing - 
SIC codes 0-999, Construction - 1500-1799, Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate – 6000-
6799, Mining – 1000-1499, Manufacturing - 2000-3999, Services – 7000-8999, 
Transportation & Public Utilities - 4000-4999, and Wholesale Trade - 5000-5199. 
 
In Table 5, I present the correlation matrix for the variables analyzed in the study. The 
significance of the correlations is indicated in the matrix. Based on Cohen (1988), 
relationships between 0.1 and 0.23 are considered weak, between 0.24 and 0.36 are 
considered moderately strong, and above 0.37 are considered strong. I begin by discussing 
the relationship between the independent IR variables. I continue by discussing the 
correlations between the independent IR variables and the dependent variables. Finally, I 
discuss the correlations between the aforementioned independent and dependent variables 
and the control variables.  
The independent IR variables Top3II and Callsbefore are weakly negatively correlated 
(-0.1853), a relationship that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This relationship is 
somewhat surprising, as intuitively a company holding more conference calls might be 
expected to be more likely highly ranked by investors. Correlation between Top3II and 
Callafter were relatively uncorrelated (-0.0128), and this relationship was not statistically 
significant even at the 0.10 level. In my sample, companies with a Top3II ranking were 
slightly less likely to conduct a conference call following the announcement of an 




While correlation was low and not statistically significant, acquirers that conducted more 
conference calls before an announcement were slightly less likely to conduct a conference 
call in the days following the acquisition announcement.  
I now review the correlations between the independent IR variables and the dependent 
variables (CAR and Complete). Reviewing the relationships between the independent 
variables and the first dependent variable (CAR) used in Hypotheses 1-3, Top3II was weakly 
positively correlated with CAR (0.1569), a relationship that was significant at the 5% level. 
Callsbefore was slightly negatively correlated with CAR (-0.0271), but the relationship was 
not significant even at the 10% level. Callafter had a slightly negative correlation with CAR 
(-0.0301), also not significant at the 10% level. 
Reviewing the relationships between the independent IR variables and the dependent 
variable (Complete) used in Hypotheses 4-6, Callafter had a moderately strong positive 
correlation with Complete (0.3101) that is significant at the 1% level. Top3II had a weak 
negative correlation (-0.2364) with Complete that is also significant at the 1% level. 
Callsbefore had a slightly positive correlation with Complete (0.0204), but the relationship is 
not significant at the 10% level. CAR and Complete are relatively uncorrelated (0.0050), and 
this correlation is not significant at the 10% level. 
Including the control variables, there are only two strong correlations in the matrix. Both 
Top3II with LogMV (-0.4865) and AcqMtB with ROE (0.5504) are significant at the 1% 
level. CAR only had a significant relationship with LogMV (-0.2017), a weak negative 
correlation. Complete had a moderately strong  (0.3047) relationship with LogMV that was 
significant at the 1% level. Complete also had weak relationships with Cash (0.3047), Public 




Between the control variables and the independent variables, other than the previously 
noted strong relationship between Top3II and LogMV, there are only three significant 
relationships that qualify as at least weak using the Cohen (1988) criteria. There is a 
moderately strong correlation between Callsbefore and LogMV (0.3236), significant at the 
1% level. Additionally, the weak correlations of Callsbefore with Public (-0.1626) and 
Callafter with Foreign (-0.1938) are significant at least at the 5% level. The weak correlation 
between Top3II and Public (0.1082) is not significant even at the 10% level. Given the 
relatively low correlations between the IR variables and control variables, multicollinearity 




Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Variables Used in the Study 
 CAR Complete Callsbefore Callafter Top3II LogMV AcqMtB Lev ROE Cash Stock Public Diversify Foreign 
CAR  0.0050 -0.0271 -0.0301 0.1569
** -0.2017*** 0.0200 0.0570 -0.0539 -0.1086 -0.0850 0.0422 0.0806 -0.0822 
Complete  
 
0.0204 0.3101*** -0.2364*** 0.3047*** 0.0521*** -0.0726 0.0732 0.3047*** -0.0450 -0.1508** 0.0932 -0.1322** 
Callsbefore  
  
-0.0866 -0.1853*** 0.3236*** 0.0548 0.0712 0.0076 -0.0219 -0.0536 -0.1626** 0.0774 0.0045 
Callafter  
   
-0.0128 0.0048 0.0892 -0.0013 0.0020 0.0043 0.0191 0.0062 -0.0198 -0.1938*** 
Top3II  
    
-0.4865*** -0.0120 0.0265 -0.0884 -0.0632*** -0.0044 0.1082 -0.0255 -0.0202 
LogMV  
     
0.1266 -0.0911 0.1005 0.2092*** -0.0167 -0.2618*** 0.0935 -0.0152 
AcqMtB  
      
0.2343*** 0.5504*** -0.1169 0.1087 -0.1087 -0.0791 -0.1429** 
Lev  
       
0.2167*** -0.0537 0.0036 -0.0949 0.0204 -0.0293 
ROE  
        
-0.1369** 0.0938 -0.1446** -0.1627** -0.0692 
Cash  
         
-0.3131*** -0.1835*** 0.1603** 0.0362 
Stock  
          
0.1501** -0.1302 0.0358 
Public  
           
-0.1129 -0.1234 
Diversify  
            
-0.0320 
Foreign  
             






Event Study Results ‒ Stock Price Abnormal Returns 
In this section, I discuss the abnormal returns around acquirer announcement dates for the 
study’s sample. Table 6 depicts the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement found in 
this sample. Table 6 Panel A shows the daily event window abnormal returns compared with 
a value weighted index for each day in the five-day period measured in this sample (-2, +2). 
Notably, mean abnormal returns were positive for four of the five days, indicating that 
investors generally considered the acquisition announcements as positive events. Mean 
abnormal returns on days -2 (two trading days before the acquisition announcement) and day 
0 (announcement date) were positive and statistically significant. Mean abnormal returns on 
days -1 and +1 were also positive, but not statistically significant. Returns on day +2 were 
negative, but not statistically significant. 
Table 6 Panel B shows the sample’s mean five-day (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal return 
surrounding the acquisition announcement at day 0. Five-day cumulative abnormal returns 
were used as the dependent variable for each of the observations. The sample’s mean 
cumulative abnormal return was 0.89%, and the precision-weighted cumulative average 
abnormal return was 0.77%, also implying that, on average, investors saw the acquisitions to 
be positive developments for the acquiring companies. The Patell-Z test statistic of 1.639 
indicates that the mean cumulative abnormal return was significant at the 10% level. The 
finding of positive abnormal returns surrounding acquisition announcements is consistent 






Table 6. Abnormal Returns Surrounding Acquisition Announcement 
Panel A Daily Event Window Market Model Abnormal Returns; Value Weighted Index 
Day N Mean Abnormal Return Positive: Negative Patell Z 
Generalized  
Sign Z 
-2 227 0.19% 120:107 1.558* 1.076 
-1 227 0.18% 107:120 0.727 -0.650 
0 227 0.56% 117:110 1.644* 0.677 
1 227 0.07% 111:116 0.037 -0.119 
2 227 -0.12%     98:129** -1.192 -1.845** 












(-2,+2) 227 0.89% 0.77% 121:106 1.639* 1.208 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Regression Results and Discussion 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 related to the impact of investor relations on stock price abnormal 
returns surrounding the announcement of an acquisition. I used pooled ordinary least squares 
regression analysis to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 for which CAR was the dependent variable. 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 related to the impact of investor relations on the likelihood that a 
company would complete an announced acquisition. I used logistic regression analysis to test 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 for which Complete was the dependent variable.  
Model Results  
Hypothesis 1 relates to the impact of a top three buy-side ranking in the Institutional 
Investor magazine “Best Investor Relations” poll on cumulative abnormal returns for the five 
days surrounding an acquisition announcement. I predicted that stocks of companies ranked 
by buy-side investors in the top three companies in a sector in the most recent “Best IR” poll 
should have better cumulative abnormal returns than companies not ranked in the top three 




regression coefficient for Top3II of -0.0149 in the opposite direction as predicted in the 
hypothesis and the corresponding t-statistic of -2.38 is significant at the 5% level. In the full 
model, the coefficient for Top3II of -0.0038 is also in the opposite direction as predicted in 
the hypothesis, but the corresponding t-statistic of -0.53 is not significant at the 10% level. I 
find no significant relationship between Top3II and CAR in the full model. Accordingly, 





Table 7. Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 Regression of Top3II Ranking  
on Announcement CARs 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Top3II -0.0149 -0.0038 
 (-2.3800)** (-0.5300) 
Industry   
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  -0.0550 
  (-1.4000) 
Construction  0.0052 
  (0.0800) 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  0.0013 
  (0.0800) 
Manufacturing  0.0332 
  (2.4700)** 
Mining  -0.0277 
  (-1.3300) 
Services  0.0180 
  (0.9900) 
Transportation & Public Utilities  0.0044 
  (0.2600) 
LogMV  -0.0136 
  (-2.1300)** 
AcqMtB  0.0013 
  (0.5000) 
Lev  0.0306 
  (0.8900) 
ROE  -0.0673 
  (-1.5400) 
Cash  0.0088 
  (1.6200) 
Stock  0.0170 
  (1.6500) 
Public  -0.0006 
  (-0.0900) 
Diversify  -0.0079 
  (-1.3900) 
Foreign  0.0014 
  (0.2200) 
Intercept -0.0002 0.1207 
 (-0.0400) (1.7200)* 
Model Statistics   
N 227 227 
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.0279 7.0926 
F-statistic 5.6780** 2.0149** 
t statistics in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
To better understand the results, I conducted a series of robustness checks. First, I 
included the cross between Top3II and Callsbefore as there is likely to be a relationship 




investor rankings of its IR function. The coefficient for Top3II in this model, including the 
cross variable, was similar to the coefficient obtained in the full regression model without the 
cross variable and the corresponding t-statistic remained not significant at the 10% level. 
As another robustness test, I also reviewed the data set to determine whether the 
relationship between Top3II and CAR was stronger for companies in which the relative size 
of the deal (transaction value divided by the market capitalization of the acquirer four weeks 
prior to the deal announcement) was larger (Relsize). I divided the announcement data set 
into two, a larger relative deal size group (the companies above the sample’s median Relsize) 
and a smaller relative size deal size group (the companies at or below the median Relsize). 
This division reflects the likelihood that the importance of an acquisitions and investor 
reactions to it may be impacted by the relative size of the transaction to the company. When 
reviewing the full model as described in the hypothesis test by Relsize cohort, the Top3II 
variable was not significant for either the larger relative deal size or smaller deal size cohort.  
I also reviewed the model to determine whether the cumulative abnormal return from 90 
days before the deal announcement to three days prior to the deal announcement 
(CARbefore) impacted the relationship between Top3II and CAR. CARbefore accounts for 
the possibility that the acquisition was already embedded into the stock price prior to the 
announcement. Similar to the process described above for the relative size of the deal, I 
divided the data set into two cohorts, a higher CARbefore cohort (the companies above the 
sample’s median CARbefore) and a lower CARbefore cohort (the companies at or below the 
median CARbefore ). Similar to the results obtained when reviewing the model split by 





As a final robustness check, I reviewed the relationship between Top3II and CAR for 
only the companies below $50 billion of market capitalization. The purpose of this analysis 
was to determine whether investor rankings were more significant in determining cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding an acquisition announcement for smaller companies in the 
S&P 500. As the companies below $50 billion of market cap are smaller than the largest 
companies in the S&P 500, they might be slightly less likely to be in portfolios and a Top 3 
ranking in the annual Institutional Investor “Best Investor Relations” poll might mean more 
to those companies. When reviewing the full regression model for only those companies, the 
coefficient for Top3II in the opposite direction as predicted by the hypothesis, and the 
corresponding t-statistic is significant at the 10% level. When only reviewing companies 
below $50 billion of market cap, stocks of companies highly ranked by buy-side investors in 
the “Best Investor Relations” poll had lower cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of an acquisition than their unranked peers. 
Hypothesis 2 relates to the impact of investor conference calls in the 365 days prior to 
the announcement of an acquisition on cumulative abnormal returns for the five days 
surrounding the acquisition announcement. I predicted that stocks of companies that conduct 
more investor calls should have better cumulative abnormal returns than stocks of companies 
that do fewer calls. Regression results are depicted in Table 8. In the reduced model, the 
regression coefficient for Callsbefore of -0.0007 is in the opposite direction as predicted in 
the hypothesis, but the corresponding t-statistic of -0.41 is not significant at the 10% level. In 
the full model, the coefficient for Callsbefore of -0.0000 is also slightly in the opposite 




significant at the 10% level. Accordingly, I find no significant relationship between 
Callsbefore and CAR, and Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Table 8. Regression Results for Hypothesis 2 Regression of Pre-Announcement  
Calls on Announcement CARs 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Callsbefore -0.0007 -0.0000 
 (-0.4100) (-0.0100) 
Industry   
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  -0.0590 
  (-1.5200) 
Construction  0.0065 
  (0.1000) 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  0.0023 
  (0.1400) 
Manufacturing  0.0339 
  (2.5100)** 
Mining  -0.0279 
  (-1.3400) 
Services  0.0181 
  (0.9900) 
Transportation & Public Utilities  0.0056 
  (0.3300) 
LogMV  -0.0153 
  (-2.6100)*** 
AcqMtB  0.0015 
  (0.5800) 
Lev  0.0056 
  (0.8600) 
ROE  -0.0695 
  (-1.6000) 
Cash  0.0087 
  (1.5900) 
Stock  0.0170 
  (1.6600) 
Public  -0.0005 
  (-0.0800) 
Diversify  -0.0080 
  (-1.4100) 
Foreign  0.0014 
  (0.2200) 
Intercept 0.0144 0.1393 
 (1.0000) (2.2900)** 
Model Statistics   
N 227 227 
Adjusted 𝐴𝐴2(%) -0.3710 6.9677 
F-statistic 0.1648 1.9957** 
t statistics in parentheses. 





I performed the same robustness checks for Hypothesis 2 as I did for Hypothesis 1. 
Inclusion of 1) the cross between Top3II and Callsbefore as a variable, 2) dividing the data 
set into Relsize cohorts, and 3) dividing the data set into CARbefore cohorts does not 
materially impact the results found in the full model tested in the hypothesis above. The 
coefficients for Callsbefore remain generally similar to the coefficient obtained in the full 
regression model without the cross variable, and the corresponding t-statistics remain not 
significant at the 10% level. When including the observations for only those companies 
below $50 billion of market capitalization in the full regression model, the t-statistic 
corresponding to the Callsbefore coefficient also remains not significant at the 10% level. 
Hypothesis 3 relates to the impact of a conference call following an acquisition 
announcement (days 0, 1, 2) on cumulative abnormal returns for the five days surrounding 
the acquisition announcement. I predicted that stocks of companies that hold investor calls 
following acquisition announcements should have better cumulative abnormal returns than 
companies that do not hold calls. Regression results are depicted in Table 9. In the reduced 
model, the regression coefficient for Callafter of 0.0070 is in the direction predicted in the 
hypothesis, but the corresponding t-statistic of 0.45 is not significant at the 10% significance 
level. In the full model, the coefficient for Callafter of 0.0044 is also in the direction 
predicted in the hypothesis, but the corresponding t-statistic of 0.63 is again not significant at 
the 10% level. In the full model, I find no significant relationship between Callafter and 





Table 9. Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 Regression of Post-Announcement  
Calls on Announcement CARs 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Callafter 0.0070 0.0044 
 (0.4500) (0.6300) 
Industry   
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  -0.0598 
  (-1.5500) 
Construction  0.0059 
  (0.0900) 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  0.0025 
  (0.1500) 
Manufacturing  0.0340 
  (2.5400)** 
Mining  -0.0266 
  (-1.2700) 
Services  0.0194 
  (1.0600) 
Transportation & Public Utilities  0.0055 
  (0.3300) 
LogMV  -0.0152 
  (-2.7500)*** 
AcqMtB  0.0016 
  (0.6200) 
Lev  0.0297 
  (0.8700) 
ROE  -0.0703 
  (-1.6200) 
Cash  0.0087 
  (1.6100) 
Stock  0.0169 
  (1.6500) 
Public  -0.0004 
  (-0.0600) 
Diversify  -0.0079 
  (-1.3900) 
Foreign  0.0022 
  (0.3400) 
Intercept 0.0067 0.1353 
 (0.9500) (2.2300)** 
Model Statistics   
N 227 227 
Adjusted 𝐴𝐴2(%) -0.3530 7.1436 
F-statistic 0.2047 2.0227** 
t statistics in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
As I did for Hypotheses 1 and 2, I tested whether dividing the data set into cohorts 
grouped by Relsize and CARbefore would materially impact the results found in the full 




set into CARbefore cohorts does not materially impact the results found in the full model 
tested in the hypothesis above. The coefficients for Callafter remained generally similar to 
the coefficient obtained in the full regression model, and the corresponding t-statistics 
remained not significant at the 10% level. Additionally, reviewing the full regression model 
for only those companies below $50 billion of market capitalization, the t-statistic 
corresponding to the Callafter coefficient remained not significant at the 10% level. 
Hypothesis 4 relates to the impact of investor conference calls in the 365 days prior to 
the announcement of an acquisition on the likelihood that a company would complete its 
announced acquisition. I predicted that stocks of companies ranked by buy-side investors in 
the top three companies in a sector in the most recent Institutional Investor magazine “Best 
IR” poll would be more likely to complete announced acquisitions than companies not 
ranked in the top three companies in a sector. Regression results are depicted in Table 10. In 
the reduced model, the regression coefficient for Top3II of -0.7049 is in the opposite 
direction as predicted in the hypothesis, and the corresponding t-statistic of 11.42 is 
significant at the 1% level. In the full model, the coefficient for Top3II of -0.3539 is also in 
the opposite direction as predicted in the hypothesis, but the corresponding t-statistic of 1.34 
is not significant at the 10% level. In the full model, I find no significant relationship 





Table 10. Regression Results for Hypothesis 4 Regression of Top3II Ranking  
on Completion of Deal 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Top3II -0.7049 -0.3539 
 (11.4200)*** (1.3400) 
Industry   
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  11.3734 
  Unstable 
Construction  11.6080 
  Unstable 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  -7.1387 
  Unstable 
Manufacturing  -6.6968 
  Unstable 
Mining  -6.2266 
  Unstable 
Services  10.9874 
  Unstable 
Transportation & Public Utilities  -6.1473 
  Unstable 
LogMV  -0.5175 
  (2.9000) 
AcqMtB  -0.0142 
  (0.0200) 
Lev  2.2160 
  (1.8800) 
ROE  -1.2214 
  (0.3700) 
Cash  0.4884 
  (3.95)** 
Stock  0.0607 
  (0.0200) 
Public  -0.8194 
  (3.0100) 
Diversify  0.1817 
  (0.4000) 
Foreign  -0.5993 
  (5.0000)** 
Intercept 5.5739 13.0619 
 (56.9400)*** Unstable 
Model Statistics   
N 227 227 
Entropy 𝐴𝐴2 (%) 6.0300 24.4000 
χ2 10.6977*** 43.2466*** 
χ2 statistics in parentheses 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
I performed similar robustness tests for Hypothesis 4 as I did for Hypotheses 1 and 2. I 
tested whether including the cross between Top3II and Callsbefore, dividing the sample into 




found in the full model tested in the hypothesis. None of these revisions to the model had a 
material impact on the relationship between Top3II and Complete. The coefficients are 
generally similar to those found in the full model tested in the hypothesis and remain not 
significant at the 10% level. 
However, when reviewing the full regression model for only those companies with 
market capitalizations under $50 billion, the coefficient for Top3II is significant at the 10% 
significance level, but in the opposite direction as predicted by the hypothesis. The 
companies that were under $50 billion of market capitalization that were highly ranked by 
buy-side investors in the “Best Investor Relations” poll were less likely to complete an 
announced deal than their unranked peers. 
Hypothesis 5 relates to the impact of investor conference calls in the 365 days prior to 
the announcement of an acquisition on the likelihood that a company would complete its 
announced acquisition. I predicted that stocks of companies that do more investor calls would 
be more likely to complete announced acquisitions than companies that do fewer calls. 
Regression results are depicted in Table 11. In the reduced model, the regression coefficient 
for Callsbefore of -0.0193 is in the opposite direction as predicted in the hypothesis but is not 
significant at the 10% level. In the full model, the coefficient for Callsbefore of 0.1405 is in 
the direction as predicted in the hypothesis but is also not significant at the 10% level. 





Table 11. Regression Results for Hypothesis 5 Regression of Pre-Announcement  
Calls on Completion of Deal 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Callsbefore -0.0193 0.1405 
 (0.0900) (2.6700) 
Industry   
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  10.8467 
  Unstable 
Construction  12.0288 
  Unstable 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  -7.1871 
  Unstable 
Manufacturing  -6.7654 
  Unstable 
Mining  -6.3688 
  Unstable 
Services  11.0986 
  Unstable 
Transportation & Public Utilities  -5.9618 
  Unstable 
LogMV  -0.9289 
  (11.3900)*** 
AcqMtB  -0.0030 
  (0.0000) 
Lev  1.7656 
  (1.1600) 
ROE  -1.5781 
  (0.5700) 
Cash  0.4417 
  (3.2300) 
Stock  0.0402 
  (0.0100) 
Public  -0.8547 
  (3.3600) 
Diversify  0.2130 
  (0.5400) 
Foreign  0.5981 
  (4.9300)** 
Intercept 2.0442 16.5674 
 (13.0300) Unstable 
Model Statistics   
N 227 227 
Entropy R2 (%) 0.0500 25.2600 
χ2 0.0936 44.7846*** 
χ2 statistics in parentheses 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
I performed similar robustness tests for Hypothesis 5 as I did for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. 
The robustness tests did not yield significantly different results from the full model tested in 




2) dividing the data set into Relsize cohorts, and 3) dividing the data set into CARbefore 
cohorts did not materially impact the results found in the full model tested in the hypothesis 
above. The coefficients for Callsbefore remained generally similar to the coefficient obtained 
in the full regression model without the cross variable, and the corresponding t-statistics 
remained not significant at the 10% level. Finally, when reviewing the full regression model 
for only those companies below $50 billion of market capitalization, the t-statistic 
corresponding to Callsbefore was also not significant at the 10% level. 
Hypothesis 6 relates to the impact of conference calls following acquisition 
announcements (days 0, 1, 2) on the likelihood that companies would complete their 
announced acquisitions. I predicted that companies that hold investor calls following 
acquisition announcements would be more likely to complete announced acquisitions than 
companies that do not hold investor calls. Regression results are depicted in Table 12. In the 
reduced model, the regression coefficient for Callafter of 0.9288 is in the direction predicted 
in the hypothesis and the corresponding t-statistic of 18.25 is significant at the 1% level. In 
the full model, the coefficient for Callafter of 1.1754 is in the direction as predicted in the 
hypothesis, and the corresponding t-statistic of 16.20 is also significant at the 1% level. I find 
a significant positive relationship between Callafter and Complete. Accordingly, Hypothesis 





Table 12. Regression Results for Hypothesis 6 Regression of Post-Announcement  
Calls on Completion of Deal 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Callafter 0.9288 1.1754 
 (18.2500)*** (16.2000)*** 
Industry   
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  10.6257 
  Unstable 
Construction  11.5084 
  Unstable 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  -6.8886 
  Unstable 
Manufacturing  -6.4092 
  Unstable 
Mining  -6.0880 
  Unstable 
Services  11.4098 
  Unstable 
Transportation & Public Utilities  -6.0291 
  Unstable 
LogMV  -0.7073 
  (7.7800)*** 
AcqMtB  0.0540 
  (0.1900) 
Lev  2.2612 
  (1.7100) 
ROE  -1.9181 
  (0.7500) 
Cash  0.4569 
  (3.0800) 
Stock  0.0677 
  (0.0200) 
Public  -0.6748 
  (2.1800) 
Diversify  0.2685 
  (0.7200) 
Foreign  -0.3908 
  (1.7300) 
Intercept 1.4084 14.2002 
 (41.9700)*** Unstable 
Model Statistics   
N 227 227 
Entropy 𝐴𝐴2 (%) 9.5800 33.2000 
χ2 16.9805*** 58.8581*** 
χ2 statistics in parentheses 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
As for Hypotheses 4 and 5, I tested whether dividing the data set into cohorts grouped by 
Relsize and CARbefore would materially impact the results found in the full model tested in 




companies below $50 billion of market capitalization. In each of these robustness tests, the 
coefficient for Callafter remained in the same direction as predicted by Hypothesis 6, and the 
corresponding t-statistic was significant at the 5% level. 
Discussion 
Research has shown IR to have a positive impact on numerous corporate and stock 
outcomes, including share price performance (Agarwal, 2008; Jiao, 2011; Bushee & Miller, 
2012), cost of capital (Ly, 2010; Bushee & Miller, 2012; Vlittis & Charitou, 2012), analyst 
following (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Francis et al., 1997; Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000; 
Chang et al. 2009), and consistency in analyst estimates (Farragher et al., 1994; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). Additionally, research has shown some positive relationships between IR 
characteristics and M&A outcomes, including cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
acquisition announcements (Fraunhoffer et al., 2018; Kimbrough & Louis, 2011) and 
completion of M&A deals (Upton, 2018).  
My study was designed to provide additional insight into the specific IR characteristics 
and activities that might yield positive outcomes for acquiring companies. I expected that 
more conference calls ahead of deals and better investor ratings of companies’ IR functions 
would lead to higher levels of investor trust (and improved returns) when companies 
announce acquisitions. I endeavored to learn whether actions prior to announcements of deals 
in the form of investor calls in the year before announcements of acquisitions or investor 
perceptions of companies’ IR functions would lead to improved outcomes for acquiring 
companies. I also expected that holding investor conference calls following announcements 
of acquisitions would provide better information to investors who might be more likely to 




and leading to a higher probability that acquisitions were ultimately completed. Accordingly, 
I also sought to determine whether activities immediately following acquisition 
announcements in the form of investor calls would be beneficial for acquirers.  
In my study, I hypothesized that investor relations activities in the form of conference 
calls before and after deal announcements and IR quality in the form of buy-side investor 
ratings would have a positive influence on the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding deal 
announcements and companies’ ability to complete announced acquisitions. Only one of the 
six hypotheses (Hypothesis 6) was fully supported in this study. Holding investor calls 
following deal announcements was associated with a higher likelihood of completing the 
deals. Consequently, companies seeking to complete announced acquisitions should consider 
hosting at least one investor conference call following the announcement.  
Surprisingly, investor ratings of company IR functions appeared to have a negative 
influence on both cumulative abnormal returns surrounding acquisition announcements and 
the likelihood that companies would ultimately complete acquisitions. In both Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 4, the coefficient for Top3II was in the opposite direction as predicted by the 
hypothesis. While the t-statistic corresponding to Top3II in both hypotheses was not 
significant in the full model, when reviewing only the observations for companies smaller 
than $50 billion of market capitalization, the t-statistic was significant at the 10% level. This 
finding implies that stocks of companies under $50 billion of market capitalization that have 
an investor relations function that is highly rated by investors underperform their less highly 
rated peers upon announcements of acquisitions. Those companies are also less likely to 




There are several potential reasons for the inverse relationship between IR ratings and 
returns and the lack of relationship between IR activities and returns surrounding a deal. 
First, perhaps the reason for the outperformance is surprise. It is possible that investors better 
understand the potential acquisitions of companies which conduct more IR activities, or 
which are perceived by investors to have higher IR quality. In this case, investors may have a 
better general understanding that these companies will make an acquisition before they 
announce it. As acquisitions tend to be associated with share outperformance surrounding the 
announcement, companies for which an acquisition is expected may already have that 
acquisition embedded in the stock price. Companies that have lower rated IR functions may 
be more likely to surprise investors to the positive when announcing an acquisition, and their 
stocks may be more likely to outperform upon announcement.  
Also, IR is generally associated with higher multiples (Ly, 2010; Bushee & Miller, 2012; 
Vlittis & Charitou, 2012). Accordingly, there may generally be less upside remaining to 
shares of companies that conduct more or higher quality IR activities. While I tried to control 
for the effect of valuation multiples by including a market to book control variable in each of 
the models, there may be some impact from the higher IR companies already receiving more 
full valuations. 
As mentioned above, IR ratings were negatively associated with likelihood of completing 
an announced acquisition for companies below $50 million of market capitalization. This 
result was somewhat surprising as conducting IR calls after deal announcements was 
associated with higher likelihood of companies completing acquisitions. It is possible that the 
investors who rate companies’ investor relations functions highly do so because they hold a 




completed, so most announced deals were completed. However, if a company announces a 
deal that the investor base does not approve, representatives of better-rated IR functions may 
be more likely to obtain more information about why buy-side investors do not approve of 
the deal. Armed with better information from its IR function, the management team and 
board of directors of a highly rated IR company may be more likely to terminate a poorly 









While only one of the study’s six hypotheses was fully supported, my study adds to 
our understanding of investor relations. Completing an announced acquisition is a 
significant goal for management teams and a significant corporate outcome for research 
to examine. This is the first study to support the notion that IR activities in the period 
immediately following an acquisition announcement are associated with an increased 
likelihood of completing the deal. As such, the study adds to our understanding of IR and 
more generally to the understanding of antecedents to completion of mergers. 
Additionally, given the importance of completing an acquisition to company executives 
and boards, the finding that post-deal IR conference calls are associated with a higher 
likelihood of successful completion of a deal has clear implications for practice. 
The study has several limitations. First, the data set was limited to the S&P 500. By 
their inclusion in this key index, the companies in my sample might be generally more 
closely followed by investors than companies with smaller market capitalization or non-
U.S. companies. As a result, there may be less difference in their IR efforts than among 
companies not included in the S&P 500, for which investor interest and IR efforts may 




Second, the results in the Institutional Investor magazine “Best Investor Relations” poll 
may be impacted by investor perceptions of the questions. As a result, the poll may not 
accurately reflect IR quality. Poll results could be more reflective of a company’s stock 
performance during the prior year, wide inclusion of its stock in more portfolios, 
aggressiveness with which the IR team seeks a high ranking in the poll, or popularity of 
specific IR individuals than of the quality of the company’s investor relations activities 
during the prior year.  
Third, public investor conference calls for which there are transcripts may provide fewer 
new insights into merger and acquisition activity than other IR activities. Companies may be 
more hesitant to discuss their acquisition plans and strategy in public forums than they are in 
meetings or calls with individual investors. As executives might be fearful that their 
comments might be misunderstood or perceived by investors to be different from the 
company’s other public statements, they may choose to avoid discussing acquisition plans in 
as much detail as they would in a longer form, unrecorded conversation with an investor.  
Finally, IR is only one channel through which investors can gain understanding of 
company activities. There are other ways investors can gain information on a company, most 
notably through the company’s own disclosures or from disclosures, IR activities of other 
relevant companies (such as competitors, suppliers, and customers), and their own 
proprietary industry research. The information gleaned from these sources outside IR might 
also impact how investors view acquisitions and thus the share price reaction to acquisition 
announcements.  
Future research could expand the study to companies outside the S&P 500. There may be 




capitalizations that are likely to be less widely followed by professional investors than the 
large cap S&P 500 companies. IR may serve a more important role in information gathering 
for investors in those companies that are not included in the primary U.S. large cap index. 
Smaller companies and companies outside the U.S. may need to rely more on their IR 
function to inform and attract potential investors. S&P 500 companies may exhibit less 
variation in IR requirements and activities among companies, so studying these non-S&P 500 
companies could provide a larger difference between high IR activity companies and low IR 
activity companies. 
Additionally, research can examine the impact of IR activities following a deal on returns 
in subsequent periods. As companies move from announcements of acquisitions to 
completion and integration of the acquired entities, investors continue to have informational 
needs. A review of the role of IR in the post-announcement phase may provide insights into 
both IR’s role and M&A returns. 
Besides conference calls and investor ratings, research could also examine other IR 
activities and characteristics that might influence acquisition outcomes. Review of in-person 
conferences, site visits, and one-on-one meetings and calls might add more insight into how 
IR can affect investor views, stock performance, and corporate outcomes. A review of those 
variables might also provide a better understanding of the ways that investors gain 
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Acquirer cumulative abnormal 
return CAR (-2,+2) “CAR” 
Cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring company's stock for the 
5 days surrounding the acquisition announcement, in which the 
acquisition date is day 0. Like Upton (2018), the returns are 
calculated using the market model estimated from 240 days  to 41 
days before the announcement. The market return is the CRSP 
value-weighted index return. 
Completed deal “Complete” Binary variable indicating whether the acquisition was ultimately 
completed by the announcing company - 0 if the acquirer completed 




conference calls “Callsbefore” 
Number of investor conference calls held by the acquirer in the 365 
days prior to the acquisition announcement. This variable is 
represented by the number of transcripts in the CapitalIQ transcript 
database. 
Post-announcement investor 
conference call “Callafter” 
Binary variable indicating whether the acquiring company held at 
least one investor conference call between the acquisition 
announcement date and the two business days following the 
announcement date (0 if the acquiring company held a call, 1 
otherwise). 
Institutional Investor “Best IR” 
buy side poll rank “Top3II” 
Binary variable indicating whether the acquiring company ranked in 
the top 3 places in its sector in the most recent annual “Best 
Investor Relations” poll conducted by Institutional Investor 
magazine prior to the announcement. 
Control Variables 
 
Acquirer industry “Industry” Companies were assigned to industries as follows: Agriculture, 
Forestry, & Fishing - SIC codes 0-999, Construction - 1500-1799, 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate – 6000-6799, Mining – 1000-
1499, Manufacturing - 2000-3999, Services – 7000-8999, 
Transportation & Public Utilities - 4000-4999, and Wholesale Trade 
- 5000-5199. 
Acquirer firm size “LogMV” Log of the market value of equity (USD in millions) four weeks 




Acquirer market-to-book ratio 
“AcqMtB” 
Acquirer market value of equity four weeks before the acquisition 
announcement date (from CRSP) divided by the book value of equity in 
the most recent fiscal year end prior to the announcement date (from 
Compustat). 
Acquirer leverage “Lev” Book value of acquirer's liabilities (from CRSP) divided by the book value 
of total assets (from CRSP) as of the most recent fiscal year end before 
the acquisition announcement. 
Acquirer return on equity “ROE” Acquirer's income excluding extraordinary items for the most recently 
completed fiscal year before the announcement (from CRSP) divided by 
the book value of equity as of the most recently completed fiscal year 
before the announcement (from CRSP)  
Form of consideration (cash) 
“Cash” 
Indicator variable - 0 if the announced form of consideration consisted of 
only cash, 1 otherwise. 
Form of consideration (stock) 
“Stock” 
Indicator variable - 0 if the announced form of consideration consisted of 
only stock, 1 otherwise. 
Form of consideration (mixed) 
“Mixed 
Indicator variable - 0 if the announced form of consideration consisted of 
both cash and stock, 10 otherwise. Item is not included in the model as 
each observation was Cash, Stock, or Mixed. 
Public vs private target “Public” Binary variable indicating whether the target was public or private - 0 if 
the target was publicly traded, 1 otherwise. 
Diversifying deal “Diversify” Binary variable indicating whether the target was in the same industry as 
the acquirer as represented by the two digit SIC code in Thomson 
Financial SDC - 0 if diversifying, 1 if same industry. 
Foreign vs. domestic target 
“Foreign” 
Binary variable indicating whether the target was based in a foreign 
country or the U.S. - 0 if foreign, 1 if U.S. 
Relative size of transaction to 
acquiring company “Relsize” 
Transaction value divided by the market capitalization of the acquirer four 
weeks prior to the deal announcement. This variable is only used in the 
robustness tests for each hypothesis. 
Acquirer cumulative abnormal 
return CAR (-90,-3) 
“CARbefore” 
Cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring company's stock for the 
period starting 90 days before the deal announcement to three days prior 
to the deal announcement. Like Upton (2018), the returns are calculated 
using the market model estimated from 240 days  to 41 days before the 
announcement. The market return is the CRSP value-weighted index 
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